In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperative game. Players choose independently which coalition they want to join. The payoffs to the players are determined by an allocation rule on the underlying game and the coalition structure that results from the strategies of the players according to some formation rule. We study two well-known coalition structure formation rules. We show that for both formation rules there exists a unique component efficient allocation rule that results in a potential game and study the coalition structures resulting from potential maximizing strategy profiles.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the formation of coalition structures in case the underlying economic possibilities of the players are represented by a cooperative game. The process of coalition formation and payoff division will be modeled by means of a game in strategic form, which can be seen as a two-stage game. In the first stage, players reveal their preferred coalition and some coalition formation rule then determines the coalition structure. In the second stage, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structures.
We study two descriptions of the first stage, one reflects a stringent coalition formation rule and the other a less stringent rule. Both assume that each player chooses a coalition he wants to join. According to the stringent formation rule, two players end up in the same coalition if they choose the same coalition and all players in their preferred coalition also choose this coalition, whereas the less stringent formation rule only requires that they choose the same coalition.
The second stage, the stage of payoff division, is modeled by means of an exogenous allocation rule for cooperative games with a fixed coalition structure. The payoffs to the players are determined by applying the allocation rule to the underlying cooperative game and the coalition structure that was formed in the first stage. Aumann and Drèze (1974) study such allocation rules, mainly extensions of well-known allocation rules for cooperative games to the setting of cooperative games with a coalition structure. They impose component efficiency, which states that each element in a coalition structure should divide the total payoffs accruing to this coalition among its members. We will impose component efficiency as well.
These two-stage models of coalition formation might result in multiple equilibria. In this paper we will not interfere in the discussion on equilibrium selection. Rather, we study coalition formation models that are potential games (cf. Monderer and Shapley (1996) ). Potential games are games in strategic form with a natural and generally accepted equilibrium refinement, the potential maximizer.
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, for the two specifications of the coalition formation rule described above, we study which component efficient allocation rules result in the coalition formation game being a potential game. Secondly, if the coalition formation rule and the allocation rule are such that the coalition formation game is a potential game, we study which coalition structures result according to the potential maximizer.
We will show that if we adopt the stringent formation rule in the first stage and we impose component efficiency on the allocation rule in the second stage, then there is a unique allocation rule that results in a potential game. This allocation rule divides for each element of the coalition structure the gains over stand-alone values equally among the players in this coalition.
If we adopt the less stringent coalition formation rule rather than the stringent one and impose component efficiency on the allocation rule in the second stage, then we also find that there is a unique allocation rule that results in a potential game. This allocation rule is the extension of the Shapley value to cooperative games with coalition structures as suggested by Aumann and Drèze (1974) . Moreover, we show that with this allocation rule, if the underlying game is superadditive then the strategy profile resulting in the grand coalition is a potential maximizing strategy profile, and all potential maximizing strategy profiles result in the same payoffs.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) already present a non-cooperative two-stage game of coalition formation in (superadditive) cooperative games. The first stage is described by the stringent formation rule. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) assume that if a coalition is formed, in the second stage it equally divides the value of this coalition among its members.
An innovative approach to coalition structure formation is presented in Hart and Kurz (1983) . In contrast with the models described so far, Hart and Kurz (1983) assume that coalitions only form for the sake of bargaining over the division of the value of the grand coalition. For a specific coalition structure they employ the Shapley value in two negotiation stages, first between coalitions, and then within coalitions. The resulting allocation rule is called the coalitional Shapley value and coincides with the value for games with a priori unions of Owen (1977) . Hart and Kurz (1983) then analyze a twostage model of coalition formation. They study two descriptions of the first stage, the stringent coalition formation rule and the less stringent rule. In the second stage, the players receive the coalitional Shapley value of the underlying game with the coalition structure of the first stage. -Martinez et al. (1998) also study a two-stage model of coalition structure formation. The first stage of their model is described by the stringent coalition formation rule. Unlike Hart and Kurz (1983) , Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) do not fix an allocation rule for the second stage a priori. Rather, they study conditions on the allocation rule to ensure that if the underlying game is convex, then the grand coalition results from a strong Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game in strategic form. In this paper we show that the results shown by Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold for the less stringent formation rule.
Meca
In the last few years several papers have studied two-stage cooperation structure formation models and their relation to non-cooperative potential games. Monderer and Shapley (1996) study a participation game. Players choose whether or not to participate in some underlying cooperative game. Subsequently, a non-participating player receives some stand-alone value, whereas a participating player receives a payoff according to an allocation rule applied on the subgame of participating players. Monderer and Shapley (1996) restrict themselves to allocation rules that divide the value of the coalition of participating players among these players. They show that if such an allocation rule results in a potential game, then this allocation rule coincides with the Shapley value.
Related cooperation structure formation models are studied by Qin (1996) and Slikker et al. (1999) . Qin (1996) studies a model describing the formation of bilateral interaction links, introduced by Myerson (1991) . Qin (1996) shows that under an efficiency requirement there is only one allocation rule that results in a potential game and that is the Myerson value (cf. Myerson (1977) ). Furthermore, it is shown that if the underlying game is superadditive, then the strategy profile that results in the full cooperation structure is a potential maximizing strategy profile, and every potential maximizing strategy profile results in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure. Slikker et al. (1999) find similar results for the formation of conferences, where conferences are subsets of players, representing the possibilities of direct negotiations between the players.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries and a characterization of the extension of the Shapley value to cooperative games with coalition structures as introduced by Aumann and Drèze (1974) . In section 3 we describe the model of coalition structure formation and two coalition formation rules. We show that the results of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold if the less stringent coalition formation rule is employed rather than the the stringent coalition formation rule. In section 4 we show that for both descriptions of the first stage it holds that under a feasibility requirement there is only one allocation rule that results in a potential game: the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) for the less stringent formation rule and an allocation rule that coincides with the equal division rule of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) on the class of zero-normalized games for the stringent formation rule. In section 5 we show that if the less stringent formation rule and the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) are employed, then the strategy profile resulting in the grand coalition maximizes the potential and that every strategy profile that maximizes the potential, results in the same payoffs as are obtained if the grand coalition is formed. We conclude in section 6.
Preliminaries
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and 
Hence, a game is superadditive if the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions (weakly) exceeds the sum of the values of these coalitions. A cooperative game (N, v) is convex if for all i ∈ N and all T 1 ⊆ T 2 ⊆ N with i ∈ T 1 it holds that
So, a game is convex if the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition is (weakly) less than his marginal contribution to a superset of that coalition.
The subgame (S, v |S ) corresponding to a game (N, v) with S ⊆ N is determined by
The unanimity game (N, u R ) is the game with u R (S) = 1 if R ⊆ S and u R (S) = 0 otherwise (see Shapley (1953) ). Every game (N, v) can be written as a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e., v = R⊆N λ R (v)u R . In case there is no ambiguity about the underlying game we simply write λ R instead of λ R (v).
The Shapley value Φ of a game (cf. Shapley (1953) ) is now easily described by
The Shapley value is the unique allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, i.e.,
A game with a coalition structure is a triple (N, v, B) , where (N, v) is a cooperative game and B a partition of N. The set of all partitions of N is denoted by Π N . For notational convenience we denote for all B = {B 1 , . . . , B m } ∈ Π N , all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and all i ∈ B k :
An allocation rule γ for cooperative games with coalition structures is a function that assigns to every triple (N, v, B) a vector γ(N, v, B) ∈ IR N . In case there is no ambiguity on the underlying game, we will simply write γ(B) instead of γ(N, v, B). Aumann and Drèze (1974) studied cooperative games with coalition structures and allocation rules for these situations. Among other things they studied the allocation rule Φ AD that attributes to player i ∈ B k ∈ B the Shapley value Φ for player i of the game restricted to partition
We will refer to Φ AD as the value of Aumann and Drèze. We characterize the value of Aumann and Drèze by two properties, component efficiency and component restricted balanced contributions. Consider these properties for an allocation rule γ:
Component Efficiency (CE) For every cooperative game (N, v) and every partition
Component Restricted Balanced Contributions (CRBC) For every cooperative
. . , m}, and Let γ be an allocation rule that satisfies component efficiency and component restricted balanced contributions. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game. We will show that
, for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B, and all i ∈ B.
The proof will be by induction to |B|. Obviously, for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B with |B| = 1 it follows by component efficiency that
Let p ∈ IN, p ≥ 2. Assume that it holds for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B with |B| ≤ p − 1, and
N , all B ∈ B with |B| = p, and all i ∈ B.
Let B ∈ Π N and B ∈ B such that |B| = p. Let i ∈ B, then for all j ∈ B\{i} it holds that
where the first and third equality follow by component restricted balanced contributions of γ and Φ AD respectively. The second equality follows by the induction hypothesis. So, for all j ∈ B\{i}:
Hence,
Component efficiency of γ and Φ AD then implies that
. This completes the proof.
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Potential games associated with cooperative games, were introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . They define a potential P as a map on the set of all cooperative games. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) remark that for a specific TU-game (N, v) one can view P HM (N,v) (S) = P (S, v |S ) as a TU-game as well (see remark 2.8 of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) ). Furthermore, they show that P
If there is no ambiguity about the underlying game we will simply write P HM instead of P (N,v) . Note that a cooperative game completely determines its associated potential game and vice versa.
HM
For convenience we will sometimes refer to an associated potential game without specifying the underlying cooperative game. Finally, to avoid confusion with non-cooperative potential games, we will refer to potential games associated with cooperative games as HM-potential games.
A game in strategic form will be denoted by Γ = (N; (X i ) i∈N ; (π i ) i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the player set, X i the strategy space of player i ∈ N, and π = (π i ) i∈N the payoff function which assigns to every strategy-tuple x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ i∈N X i = X a vector in IR N . For notational convenience we write
Monderer and Shapley (1996) formally defined the class of non-cooperative potential games. A function P : i∈N X i → IR is called a potential for Γ if for every i ∈ N, every x ∈ X, and every t i ∈ X i it holds that
The game Γ is called a potential game if it admits a potential.
The following set of collections of cooperative games forms the basis for a representation theorem of potential games.
This representation theorem (cf. Ui (1996) ) describes a relation between non-cooperative potential games and Shapley values of cooperative games.
Theorem 2.2 Let Γ = (N; (X i ) i∈N ; (π i ) i∈N ) be a game in strategic form. Γ is a potential game if and only if there exists {(N, v x )} x∈X ∈ G N,X such that
Proof: See Ui (1996) .
3 A model of coalition formation
In this section we will describe two models of coalition formation. We describe the model of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) and a slight modification of this model. We will argue that this modification does not affect their results.
Both models of coalition formation we analyze in this section can be seen as twostage models. We assume that a cooperative game (N, v) is exogenously given. In the first stage, each player announces the coalition he wants to join. Depending on the announcements of the players a coalition structure results. In the second stage, players negotiate over the division of the surplus, given the coalition structure of the first stage.
This stage is modeled by means of an allocation rule.
Firstly, we will describe the model of coalition formation that is a slight modification of the model of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) . Formally, this model
represents the strategy space of player i. A strategy of a player is interpreted as the partition element this player wants to be in. A strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) induces a cooperation structure B(x) = {B 1 , . . . , B m } where players i and j are in the same partition element if and only if x i = x j , i.e., if they prefer the same partition element.
Note that this condition can only be satisfied if i ∈ x j and j ∈ x i . The payoff function
) i∈N is then defined as the allocation rule γ applied to the cooperation structure that results,
In case there is no ambiguity on the underlying game we will simply write Γ(γ) instead of Γ(N, v, γ). For notational convenience we define for all T ⊆ N and all (1998) implies that a player ends up either isolated or in the coalition that he chose. In our formulation he can also end up in a subset of the coalition that he chose. For notational convenience we define for all T ⊆ N and all x T ∈ i∈T X i , B M (x T ) as the partition of T where player i is in partition element x i if x i ⊆ T and x j = x i for all j ∈ x i . Otherwise, player i ends up isolated.
The difference between the two models of coalition structure formation is illustrated in the following example. We will show that the results of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold for our model. The allocation rules they study have the property that in a game with coalition structure (N, v, B) the payoff for player i ∈ B ∈ B depends only on (v(S)) S⊆B . We will call such an allocation rule a component restricted allocation rule. Proof: Let B = {B 1 , . . . , B m } ∈ Π N , k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and let S ⊆ B k . Define
for all i ∈ S and all T ⊆ B k \{i}. Also, for all i ∈ B k \S and all T ⊆ B k \{i},
We conclude from (5) and (6) that
for all i ∈ B k and all T ⊆ B k \{i}. Then, since γ is a component restricted allocation rule that satisfies (WM), it follows that
that for all j ∈ B k \S, j is a dummy player in (N,v S ). Hence, j is a dummy player
for all i ∈ S. Now, since (v S ) |S = v |S and γ is a component restricted al-
We conclude that
for all i ∈ S.
2
It is now straightforward to show that theorems 1 and 2 of Meca-Martinez et al.
also hold for our model. Recall that x ∈ X is a strong Nash equilibrium of Γ(γ) if there is no coalition T ⊆ N and strategy profilex T such that f
for all i ∈ T , with the inequality being strict for at least one player i ∈ T . We denote the set of strong Nash equilibria by SNE(Γ(γ)). Furthermore, we define the set of coalition structures that result according to strong Nash equilibria (strong Nash equilibrium partitions):
The following theorem corresponds to theorems 1 and 2 in Meca-Martinez et al.
(1998).
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, v) be a convex game and γ a component restricted allocation rule satisfying (WM) and (DO). Then {N} ∈ SNEP(Γ(γ)) and for all B ∈ SNEP(Γ(γ)) it holds that γ(N, v, B) = γ(N, v, {N}).
Proof: Let x ∈ X be such that γ(N, v, B(x)) = γ(N, v, {N}). Let t ∈ X, i ∈ N, and B ∈ B(t) with i ∈ B. Since γ is a component restricted allocation rule it follows that
where the inequality follows by lemma 3.1. We conclude that x ∈ SNE(Γ(γ)).
Let x ∈ X be such that γ(N, v, B(x)) = γ(N, v, {N}). By (7) it follows that for all i ∈ N it holds that γ i (N, v, B(x)) ≤ γ i (N, v, {N}). Hence, the deviation to t i = N for all i ∈ N weakly improves the payoff for all players with a strict improvement for at least one player. So, x ∈ SNE(Γ(γ)).
This completes the proof. Firstly, we study Γ(N, v, γ), the model of coalition formation with the less stringent formation rule. We show that the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) is the unique component efficient allocation rule that results in a coalition formation game that is a potential game. To accomplish this, we need two lemma's.
Lemma 4.1 Let γ be a component efficient allocation rule. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game. If the associated coalition formation game Γ(N, v, γ) is a potential game then for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B, and all i, j ∈ B it holds that
Proof: Let P be a potential for Γ (N, v, γ) . Let B ∈ Π N , B ∈ B, and i, j ∈ B. Let x be a strategy profile that results in partition B, i.e., B(x) = B. Define t i = {i} and
where the second equality follows by definition of a potential and the third equality
by component efficiency. Equation (9) implies equation (8). This completes the proof.
2
In the following lemma we show that if the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) is applied as an allocation rule then the coalition formation game is a potential game. Proof: For all x ∈ X and all R ⊆ N define
for all x ∈ X. This follows directly by noting that Φ AD can be found by computing the Shapley value for the subgames restricted to the partition elements. Now, theorem 2.2 completes the proof.
Combining the lemmas above we can prove that the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) is the unique allocation rule that results in a potential game. 
Suppose that player 3 plays strategy x 3 = {1, 2, 3}. Then part of the payoff-matrix of
is a potential game it should hold that there exists a potential P such
where the second equality follows by definition (2) of a potential and the third equality by the payoffs above. We conclude that Γ M (N, v, Φ AD ) is not a potential game.
In the following theorem we show that the model of Meca-Martinez et al. Proof: First we show the only-if-part. Assume that Γ M (N, v, γ) is a potential game with associated potential P . We will show that for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B, and all i ∈ B it holds that
Obviously, by component efficiency (12) holds for all B ∈ Π N , all B ∈ B with |B| = 1, and i ∈ B. Let p ≥ 2. We will show that (12) holds for all B ∈ Π N , all B with |B| = p, and all i ∈ B. Let B ∈ Π N and B ∈ B such that |B| = p. Let x ∈ X be a strategy profile that results in partition B, i.e., B M (x) = B. Let i, j ∈ B and define t i = {i} and
The second equality follows by definition of a potential P . We conclude that γ i (B) − v({i}) = γ j (B) − v({j}). Since i and j were chosen arbitrarily in B it follows by component efficiency that for all i ∈ B
This completes the only-if-part.
It remains to show the if-part. Let γ be the allocation rule determined by
, and all i ∈ B.
Define for all x ∈ X:
Hence, for all x ∈ X and all
So, the value of coalition T ⊆ N in the game corresponding to strategy profile x ∈ X depends only on the strategies of the players in coalition T and hence,
By theorem 2.2 it follows that Γ M (N, v, γ) is a potential game.
This completes the if-part. for all x ∈ X. Analyzing this associated potential function then implies that according to the potential maximizer, a strategy x will be chosen by the players such that
The potential maximizer selects a coalition structure that maximizes the sum over all partition elements of the payoffs each player in a partition element receives.
Potential Maximizers
In this section we will consider potential maximizing strategies in the coalition formation game Γ(N, v, Φ AD ) with (N, v) a superadditive underlying cooperative game. We will show that the cooperation structure with all players in one component results from a potential maximizing strategy profile. Subsequently, we will show that every potential maximizing strategy profile results in a cooperation structure that is payoff equivalent to this structure.
Before we can show that cooperation structure {N} results from a potential maximizing strategy profile we need some results on cooperative HM-potential games, cf. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).
Theorem 5.1 Let (N, v) be a superadditive game. Then the associated HM-potential game (N, P HM ) is also superadditive.
Proof: Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) showed that (N, P HM ) satisfies P HM (∅) = 0 and
We have to show that for all S ⊆ N and all T ⊆ N\S it holds that
The proof will be by induction to the number of elements in S ∪ T . Obviously, (15) holds for all S, T with |S ∪ T | = 0, since P HM (∅) = 0. Let p ≥ 1. Assume that (15) holds for all S, T with |S ∪ T | ≤ p − 1. We will show that (15) holds for all S, T with |S ∪ T | = p.
where the inequality follows from superadditivity of (N, v) and the induction hypothesis.
The third equality follows by equation (14). This completes the proof.
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The following lemma shows that a potential for Γ(Φ AD ) can be given in terms of the HM-potential game associated with the underlying cooperative game.
Lemma 5.1 Let (N, v) be a cooperative game. Then P with
is a potential for the coalition formation game Γ(N, v, Φ AD ).
Proof: We have to show that P is a potential. Therefore, consider x ∈ X, i ∈ N and u i ∈ X i with x i = u i . It suffices to check that
. Denote by B * 1 and B * 2 the partition elements player i belongs to according to x and (x −i , u i ) respectively. Then it follows from
where the third equality holds since B(x)\{B * 1 , B * 2 \{i}} = B(x −i , u i )\{B * 2 , B * 1 \{i}}. This completes the proof.
For every player i ∈ N we denotex i = N. Using the results above we can prove that the strategy profilex = (x i ) i∈N is a potential maximizing strategy profile.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N, v) be a superadditive game and Γ(Φ AD ) the associated coalition formation game with potential P . Thenx ∈ argmax P .
Proof: From lemma 5.1 it follows that a potential is given by
Let x ∈ X. It follows from theorem 5.1 that
Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that the set of potential maximizing strategy profiles does not depend on the choice of a particular potential. Hence,x ∈ argmax P for every potential P .
This completes the proof.
Before we can show that every potential maximizing strategy profile results in the same payoffs as the strategy profile resulting in the unique component N, we need another lemma.
Lemma 5.2 Let (N, v) be a superadditive game. Then for all S ⊆ N and all T ⊆ N\S it holds that
Proof: First note that it follows from theorem 5.1 that (N, P HM ) is superadditive. We proceed by induction to the number of elements in S ∪ T . Obviously, if |S ∪ T | = 0 then (18) holds. Let p ≥ 1. Suppose that (18) holds for all S, T with |S ∪ T | ≤ p − 1. We will show that (18) holds for all S, T with |S ∪ T | = p. Let S ⊆ N and T ⊆ N\S with
. Then since the inequality in equation (16) must hold with equality it follows that
From the induction hypothesis and equations (20) and (21) it follows that for all k ∈ S∪T
2 Using the lemma above we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Let (N, v) be a superadditive game and Γ(Φ AD ) the associated coalition formation game with potential P . Let x ∈ argmax P . Then Φ AD (B(x)) = Φ AD ({N}).
Proof: Denote B(x) = (B 1 , . . . , B m ). If Γ(Φ AD ) is a potential game then a potential is given by equation (17). Since the set of potential maximizing strategy profiles is independent of the specific potential, we can assume without loss of generality that P is given by equation (17). Then
where the equalities follow by lemma 5.1 and the inequalities follow by theorem 5.1.
Since x ∈ argmax P all inequalities hold with equality.
Let U ⊆ N then, using lemma 5.2, the following equalities are implied by the corre- 
Equation (25) implies that Φ AD (B(x)) = Φ AD ({N}). This completes the proof.
In the following example we will show that not every strategy profile that results in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure is potential maximizing. 
Hence, P HM (N) > P HM ({1, 2}) + P HM ({3, 4}). Then by lemma 5.1 it follows that P (x) > P(x), with x = ({1, 2}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {3, 4}), showing that not every strategy profile that results in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure maximizes the potential function.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied two models of coalition formation. The models differ only in the formation rule. We showed that the results of Meca-Martinez et al. Finally, we showed that if the underlying cooperative game is superadditive then the potential maximizer in our model with the value of Aumann and Drèze (1974) used as an allocation rule points towards the formation of the grand coalition. This result is in line with results of Qin (1996) and Slikker et al. (1999) who deal with link formation and conference formation respectively. However, all these results are sensitive to the superadditivity assumption and the equilibrium refinement chosen.
